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THE SCOPE OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND: A COMPREHENSIVE 
STATUTE IS NEEDED 
John A. Grayt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to Time magazine's usual practice of choosing only one 
"Person of the Year," in January, 2003, it chose three women to sym-
bolize "The Whistleblower."l The three women were Sherron Wat-
kins, employed at that time by Enron,2 Cynthia Cooper, employed by 
WorldCom,3 and Coleen Rowley, employed by the FBI.4 Sherron Wat-
kins, a former Enron vice president, reported to Kenneth Lay, En-
ron's then chairman and CEO, that the company's accounting 
methods were improper.5 Cynthia Cooper, vice president of internal 
audits, reported to WorldCom's board of directors that the company 
covered up $3.8 billion in losses by phony bookkeeping.6 Cole en 
Rowley is an FBI staff attorney who reported to FBI Director Robert 
Mueller that the Bureau had ignored pleas from her Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, field office to investigate a man subsequently indicted as a 
September 11 th co-conspirator. 7 
The image of "blowing the whistle" has several connotations. One 
is that the sound of a whistle catches and focuses the attention of 
others. Another connotation is that of causing an action to stop, as 
when a referee blows the whistle on a playing field. The image of the 
whistle blower is that of someone who gets the attention of others in 
order to stop certain conduct. The three women selected by Time are 
t J.D., 1980, University of Baltimore School of Law. Professor of Law, 
Sellinger School of Business and Management, Loyola College, Md. 
1. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: Coleen Rowley, Cynthia 
Cooper, Sherron Watkins, TIME, Jan. 6, 2003, at 30, 32. 
2. Id. at 32-33. 
3. Id. at 32. Ms. Cooper was still employed by WorldCom at the time this 
article was written. 
4. Id. Ms. Rowley remained employed by the FBI at the time this article was 
written. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 32. The author describes the subjects as 
"three women of ordinary demeanor but exceptional guts and sense ... "; 
"heroes at the scene, anointed by circumstance ... "; "people who did right 
just by doing their jobs rightly .... " Id. 
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each an example of an "internal whistleblower."8 Each tried internally 
to stop conduct she considered harmful to the company or illegal by 
notifYing superiors within her respective organization.9 None went to 
the press or to enforcement authorities. 10 They are to be admired for 
risking retaliation from superiors in their organizations. Possible acts 
of retaliation may have included dismissal, decreased opportunities 
for promotion, change to less favorable assignments or positions 
within the organization, or other adverse actions. ll Fortunately, none 
of these women were subject to retaliation and, therefore, did not 
need whistleblower protection. 12 
This Time issue, and comparable publicity, can lead people to be-
lieve that whistle blowers have legal protection when their employers 
dismiss or otherwise adversely mistreat them in retaliation for blowing 
the whistle either internally, to executive management, or externally, 
to the press and/or enforcement authorities. The legal reality, how-
ever, is much more complex. Typical whistleblowers are loyal long-
term employees, committed to the mission and success of their com-
panies. 13 They typically disclose their concerns externally only after 
they have received no corrective response internally, and only after 
much agonizing. 14 Often, whistleblowers have few or no legal reme-
dies and pay a considerable personal and professional price. 
Whistleblowers have more often than not illustrated the axiom "no 
good deed goes unpunished." Whistleblowers frequently lose their 
jobs and are often unable to obtain comparable work in the same in-
dustry.15 As a result of the great economic and emotional stress that 
they undergo, it is not uncommon for whistleblowers' marriages to 
8. See Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
"Internal whistle blowing" is contrasted with "external whistleblowing," 
which refers to an employee reporting to the press, law enforcement au-
thorities, or another third party employer, activities that the employee be-
lieves to be unethical or illegal. [d. 
9. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 32. 
10. [d. 
11. The National Whistleblower Protection Act, at http://www.whistleblowers. 
org/htmi/model_whistleblower_law.html (last visited Mar. 17,2004). "'Re-
taliatory action' means the discharge, suspension, demotion, ... harass-
ment, blacklisting or the refusal to hire an employee ... or other adverse 
employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions 
of employment, or other actions which interfere with an employees' ability 
to engage in protected activity .... " [d. This Act has not currently been 
enacted in any jurisdiction. [d. 
12. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 33. "Their lives may not have been at 
stake, but Watkins, Rowley and Cooper put pretty much everything else on 
the line. Their jobs, their health, their privacy, their sanity-they risked all 
of them .... " [d. at 32. 
13. See Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in WHISTLEBLOW-
lNG-SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 21, 21-22 (Gerald Vinten ed., 
1994). 
14. See id. 
15. See id. at 22. 
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break up, for them to become isolated from colleagues, to lose 
friends, and to even attempt suicide.16 "[W]histle-blowers don't have 
an easy time. Almost all say they would not do it again. If they aren't 
fired, they're cornered: isolated and made irrelevant. Eventually 
many suffer from alcoholism or depression."17 As explained in the 
Letter from the National Whistleblowers Center to President George 
W. Bush: 
Today, the few employees courageous enough to step for-
ward face uncertainty as to whether they can obtain adequate 
protection. Some will find a safe harbor, but most will not. 
The majority of whistle blowers will either fall into the hole 
created by the absence of any protection whatsoever, or will 
fail to obtain any relief due to deficiencies in many of the 
existing archaic whistleblower laws. 18 
Whistleblowers deserve better legal protection and so does the public. 
The absence of whistleblower protection is a major disincentive for 
concerned employees to act to protect the public by blowing the 
whistle. 
A recent common law decision in Maryland provides an opportu-
nity to assess the status of whistleblower protection under Maryland 
law. Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. recognizes for the first time in Ma-
ryland the availability of the tort of wrongful discharge to provide a 
remedy to employees fired in retaliation for reporting, in good faith, 
suspected criminal activities to public enforcement authorities. 19 
Would any of these three Time whistleblowers have legal protection 
under current Maryland law if the identical events had occurred today 
in Maryland? 
In this article, the term "whistleblower" refers, in general, to an em-
ployee who in good faith attempts to have his employer stop conduct 
that the employee reasonably believes20 to be injurious to the public21 
16. Id. 
17. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 33. 
18. See Letter from National Whistleblowers Center to President George W. 
Bush (Dec. 23, 2002), at http://www.whistleblowers.org/bushlet.htm. 
19. 370 Md. 38, 70-71,803 A.2d 482, 501 (2002). 
20. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 99, 120-21 (2000). The "reasonable 
belief' requirement is both subjective and objective. The whistle blower 
must actually believe that the employer conduct violates the law, and a rea-
sonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would also believe 
that the employer conduct violates the law. See id. 
21. Generally, the whistle blower sees the conduct as significantly injurious to 
an unknowing public. See Sam Hananel, Whistle-Blower Report Cites Abuses, at 
http://www.whistieblowers.org/Whistie-Blower%20Report%20Cites%20 
Abuses.htm (last visited April 9, 2004). Based on a survey of both govern-
ment and private sector whistleblowers, the National Whistleblower Center 
concluded that "[about] 51 percent of the respondents reported fraud or 
criminal practices, while 19 percent exposed health and safety problems, 10 
percent disclosed environmental problems, 12 percent complained of dis-
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and a violation of the law either through internal efforts-internal 
whistleblowing-and/ or by disclosing the conduct externally, either 
to the press or to enforcement authorities-external whistleblowing.22 
The good faith and reasonable belief standards do not require the 
whistle blower to have legal expertise in deciding whether or not spe-
cific conduct is indeed a violation of the law.23 It does, however, pre-
clude any protection for an employee who knowingly makes a false 
report to public enforcement authorities.24 The phrase 
"whistleblower protection" refers to a law-federal, state, statutory or 
common law-that provides a remedy to an employee discharged or 
otherwise adversely treated in retaliation for the employee's efforts to 
cause the employer to stop company-controlled conduct that the em-
ployee believes in good faith is in violation of the law.25 
This article first examines whistle blower protection available under 
Maryland statutory law26 and then the recently explained common law 
protection established in the WhoUry decision.27 In conclusion, the Ar-
ticle recommends that the Maryland General Assembly enact a com-
prehensive Whistleblower Protection Act.28 
criminatory practices, and 9 percent found wrongdoing in the medical pro-
fession." Id. 
22. "Whistle blowing" has been defined as "the disclosure by organizational 
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers to persons or organizations that may 
be able to effect action." Elletta San grey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends 
in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effective-
ness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. Bus. LJ. 177, 
178 (2002). 
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
24. WhoUry, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13. 
25. See generally Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 20, at 99-100. Typically, the 
whistleblower perceives the conduct not only as dangerous to the health 
and safety of an unsuspecting public but also as contrary to the express 
values of the organization. See Ronald Duska, Whistleblowing and Employee 
Loyalty, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 295, 300 n.2 (Joseph R. 
Desjardins & JohnJ. McCall eds., 1985). The act of whistle blowing, which 
some employees perceive as an act of disloyalty, is perceived by the 
whistle blower as an act of loyalty. See AJ. Geare, An Employee's Duty of Loy-
alty: New Zealand Law and Practice, 20 COMPo LAB. L. & POL'y J. 283, 284 
(1999). The point that to blow the whistle for reasons of morality is to act 
in one's employer's best interests and, therefore, involves no disloyalty is 
cogently argued by Robert A. Larmer, Whistleblowing and Employee Loyalty, 11 
J. Bus. ETHICS 125, 125-28 (1992). Larmer advances this argument against 
the standard view that the whistle blower's higher loyalty to the public good 
trumps his/her loyalty to the employer, and against the view of Duska that 
employees do not have a duty of loyalty to an employer. See Duska, supra, at 
297-99. 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part III. 
28. See infra Part V. 
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II. STATUTORY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER MA-
RYLAND LA~9 
There is no single comprehensive whistleblower statute in Maryland 
that covers private sector and public employees and protects both in-
ternal and external whistle blowers. 30 The Maryland legislature has en-
acted four whistleblower protection statutes, each specific to a 
particular set of circumstances with its own enforcement process and 
statutory remedy.31 
A. Maryland Whistleblower Law zn the Executive Branch of State 
Government 
One such statute is the Maryland Whistleblower Law in the Execu-
tive Branch of State Government (the "Executive Act").32 This statute 
provides a remedy to any employee of the executive branch who has 
been adversely treated for" (1) reporting what the employee reasona-
bly believes to be: (i) an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, or 
gross waste of money; (ii) a substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety; or (iii) a violation of the law; or (2) for seeking a 
remedy provided under this Act."33 To obtain a remedy for an ad-
verse retaliatory employment action, the employee may file a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Budget and Management.34 If the 
Secretary determines that a reprisal has occurred in violation of the 
Executive Act, the Secretary may: 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
(1) order the removal of any related detrimental informa-
tion from the complainant'S State personnel records; 
(2) require the head of the principal unit to: 
(i) hire, promote, or reinstate the complainant or 
end the complainant's suspension from 
employment; 
(ii) award the complainant back pay to the day of the 
violation; 
(iii) grant the complainant leave or seniority; 
All states encourage some form of whistle blowing via statutes that protect 
the reporter from retaliation. See Callahan et aI., supra note 22, at 189-90. 
These laws vary considerably addressing such other issues as to whom the 
whistle should be blown, whether motive should be considered, whether 
the whistle blower may benefit from reporting, what standard of evidence of 
wrongdoing should be required, and what remedy should be provided to a 
whistle blower who suffers retaliation, among others. See id. 
See infra Part ILA-E. 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. §§ 5-301 to 5-307 (1997 & Supp. 
2003); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. §§ 1-501 to 1-506 (Supp. 2003); MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604 (1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49b, § 16 
(2003). 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. §§ 5-301 to 5-307. 
Id. § 5-305. 
[d. §§ 5-305, 5-309. 
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(iv) take appropriate disciplinary action against any in-
dividual who caused the violation; and 
(v) take any other remedial action .... 35 
A determination by the Secretary of whether a reprisal in violation of 
the Executive Act has occurred or has not occurred may be appealed 
to the Office of Administrative Hearings, whose decision is in turn 
subject to judicial review.36 Both the administrative law judge and the 
reviewing court may award reasonable attorney's fees and legal ex-
penses to a prevailing complainant.37 
The Executive Act's protection covers only employees of the execu-
tive branch of the state government.38 The Executive Act is ambigu-
ous in that it does not indicate whether it applies to internal as well as 
to external whistle blowers. It does not state expressly "to whom" the 
employee must have disclosed the information for the disclosure of 
which the employee has suffered a reprisal. Also, the executive 
branch employee has no private cause of action.39 If the Secretary's 
determination favors the employee, the burden is on the executive 
branch employer to appeal for a review by an administrative law judge 
and, if that outcome is still unfavorable, to a circuit court.40 If the 
Secretary's determination is unfavorable to the employee, then the 
burden is on the employee to move forward with the appeal process. 41 
What additional protection, if any, does the Executive Act provide 
to those executive branch employees who have tenure as civil servants 
beyond the protection already provided under state statutory and 
state and federal constitutional safeguards against retaliatory employ-
ment actions? Maryland's Personnel and Pensions Article provides a 
grievance procedure to challenge inappropriate disciplinary actions 
by supervisors and managers as well as providing remedies when such 
actions are determined to have occurred.42 The Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes on 
public sector employers, substantive and procedural requirements 
whenever the state acts to deprive a tenured civil servant of his/her 
"property right" in a government job. 43 Substantive due process re-
35. Id. § 5-309(e). 
36. Id. § 5-310. 
37. /d. §§ 5-310(d), 5-311. 
38. Id. § 5-301. "This subtitle applies to all employees and State employees who 
are applicants for positions in the Executive Branch of State government, 
including a unit with an independent personnel system." Id. 
39. Id. § 5-307. "Election of procedures. - An employee ... may elect to file: 
(1) a complaint under § 5-309 of this subtitle; or (2) a grievance under 
Title 12 of this article." Id. § 5-307(a). 
40. Id. § 5-310(a), (e); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222 (1999). 
41. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-31O(a), (e); MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
GoV'T § 10-222. 
42. See generally MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 12-103 (1997 & Supp. 
2003). 
43. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 586 (West 1994). 
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quires that the state's deprivation be reasonably related to a legitimate 
state interest; that is, the state must be prepared to show that any ad-
verse employment action in retaliation for whistleblowing is not arbi-
trary and capricious.44 The statute expressly provides that it "does not 
prohibit a personnel action that would have been taken regardless of 
a disclosure of information."45 Procedural due process requires that, 
prior to deprivation, the employee be given adequate notice and an 
opportunity to tell his or her side of the story.46 
B. The Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act 
A second statute, enacted in 2002, is the Health Care Worker 
Whistleblower Protection Act (the "Health Care Act"),47 which pro-
vides protection to board-certified or licensed health-care workers, but 
expressly excludes state employees.48 The statute prohibits an em-
ployer from taking or refusing to take any personnel action as a repri-
sal against a covered employee because the employee: 
(I) Discloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor49 or 
board50 an activity, policy, or practice of the employer 
that is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation; 
(2) Provides information to or testifies before any public 
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry 
into any violation of a law, rule, or regulation by the em-
ployer; or 
(3) Objects to or refuses to participate in any activity, policy, 
or practice in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.51 
The whistle blower protection is available only if: 
(1) The employee has a reasonable, good faith belief that 
the employer has, or still is, engaged in a violation ... ; 
44. Nicholas v. Penn. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2000). 
45. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302(b). 
46. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw: CAsES AND 
MATERIALS 980 (4th ed. 1998); see also ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 
586-88. 
47. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. §§ 1-501 to 1-506 (Supp. 2003). 
48. ld. § 1-501. Section 1-501(c) states: "(1) 'Employee' means any individual 
licensed or certified by a board under this article who performs services for 
and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other 
remuneration. (2) 'Employee' does not include a State employee." ld. § 1-
501 (c). 
49. Section 1-501 (d) defines a "supervisor" as "any individual within an em-
ployer's organization who has the authority to direct and control the work 
performance of an employee, or who has managerial authority to take cor-
rective action regarding the violation of a law, rule, or regulation of which 
the employee complains." ld. § 1-501 (d). 
50. '''Board' means any board established under [the Health Occupations] ar-
ticle." ld.§1-501(c). 
51. ld. § 1-502(1), (2), (3). 
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(2) The employer's activity, policy, or practice that is the 
subject matter of the disclosure poses a substantial and 
specific danger to the public health or safety; and 
(3) Before reporting to the board: 
(i) The employee has reported the activity, policy, or 
practice to a supervisor or administrator of the em-
ployer in writing and afforded the employer a rea-
sonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy, 
or practice; or 
(ii) If the employer has a corporate compliance plan 
specifying who to notify of an alleged violation of a 
rule, law, or regulation, the employee has followed 
the plan. 52 
The Health Care Act provides a private cause of action, which must 
be brought within one year after the reprisal occurred or within one 
year after the employee first became aware of the reprisa1.53 A court 
may: 
(1) Issue an injunction to restrain continued violation ... ; 
(2) Reinstate the employee to the same, or an equivalent po-
sition held before the violation ... ; 
(3) Remove any adverse personnel record entries based on 
or related to the violation . . . ; 
(4) Reinstate full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 
(5) Require compensation for lost wages, benefits, and 
other remuneration; and 
(6) Assess reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation ex-
penses against: 
(i) the employer, if the employee prevails .... 54 
The court may also assess attorney's fees and litigation expenses 
against the employee if the court determines that the employee 
brought the action "in bad faith and without basis in law or fact."55 
The employer has a valid defense if the personnel action claimed to 
be a reprisal for whistle blowing was based on grounds other than the 
employee's exercise of any rights protected under the Health Care 
Act.56 
52. See id. § 1-503(1), (2), (3). 
53. See id. § 1-504(a), (b). 
54. See id. § 1-505(1) to (6). 
55. [d. § 1-505(6) (ii). 
56. See id. § 1-506. The American Nurses Association (ANA) and its local affili-
ate, the Maryland Nurses Association, were instrumental in having this law 
enacted to protect nurses against employment retaliation for reporting 
harmful patient care. See 2003 Legislation: WhistleBlower Protection (May, 
2003), at http://nursingworld.org/gova/state/2003/whistle.pdf; Maryland 
Nurses Association: 2003 Legislative Platform, at http://www.nursingworld. 
org/ snas/ md/2003Ieg.htm. 
2004] Whisdeblower Protection in the State of Maryland 233 
First, the Health Care Act provides a private cause of action with a 
one-year statute of limitation.57 Second, it does not protect all health-
care workers in Maryland. The Health Care Act covers board-certified 
or licensed-health-care workers in the private sector, or those who 
work for local-public-health-care entities.58 It does not protect non-
board licensed or uncertified-health-care workers in either the private 
or public sector-non-medical personnel such as managers or admin-
istrators. It does not protect licensed health-care workers who are 
state employees. 59 Third, the Health Care Act provides protection 
only if: (a) a covered worker has first formally and in writing engaged 
in internal whistleblowing; and (b) the report concerns employer ac-
tivity that creates a substantial and specific danger to the public health 
or safety, but not when the illegal employer activity disclosed violates 
other laws-e.g., fraudulent financial reporting.60 Fourth, the Health 
Care Act provides a remedy for internal whistleblowing.61 The Health 
Care Act creates a situation where a private health-care employer has 
an opportunity to stop an activity that creates a substantial and specific 
danger to the public health or safety; if it does not stop, it may not 
retaliate against the licensed health-care worker who first called it to 
the employer's attention and subsequently reported it to the board. 
C. Maryland Occupational and Safety Health Act (MOSHA) 
A third Maryland whistle blower protection statute is the MOSHA 
anti-retaliation provision enacted to protect employees for reporting 
occupational safety and health violations.62 The provision states that: 
(b) An employer or other person may not discharge or oth-
erwise discriminate against an employee because the 
employee: 
(1) Files a complaint related to [occupational safety and 
health] ; 
(2) Brings an action ... or a proceeding ... or causes 
the action or proceeding to be brought; 
(3) Has testified or will testify in an action ... or a pro-
ceeding . . . ; or 
(4) Exercises, for the employee or another, a right 
under this title.63 
An employee who believes that an employer or other person has dis-
charged or otherwise discriminated against the employee must sub-
mit, within thirty days after the alleged discrimination, a signed, 
57. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-504(b). 
58. [d. § 1-501. 
59. See id. 
60. [d. § 1-503. 
61. [d. § 1-502(1). 
62. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604(b) (1999). 
63. [d. 
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written complaint to the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.64 If 
the Commissioner determines that an employer or other person has 
violated the prohibition against retaliatory action, the Commissioner 
must file a complaint in the appropriate circuit court to enjoin the 
violation,65 to reinstate the employee to the former position with back 
pay,66 and for other appropriate relief.67 Within ninety days after the 
Commissioner receives a complaint, the Commissioner must notify 
the employee of the determination.68 Section 5-215(a) permits any 
person aggrieved by any order of the Commissioner to obtain judicial 
review in the circuit court.69 The Act does not provide a private cause 
of action. 70 
Nothing in MOSHA purports to give an employee any pri-
vate right of action in court for a violation of a health and 
safety standard .... [T]he remedy afforded is a complaint 
to the Commissioner, who alone is authorized to file an ac-
tion . . .. [T]he exclusive remedy for a . MOSHA related 
wrongful discharge [is] under art. 89, § 43(b) and that a tort 
action under Adler did not exist for such a discharge.71 
D. Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) 
The fourth statute is Article 49B, the FEPA, which has an anti-retali-
ation provision to protect private and public sector employees who 
oppose or report discriminatory practices.72 FEPA uses the following 
language: 
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of its employees or applicants for em-
ployment, for an employment agency to discriminate against 
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, 
because the individual has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice ... or because the individual has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an~ man-
ner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing .... 3 
If an employee thinks that the employer has committed a retaliatory 
act, the employee must file a complaint within six months of the act 
64. [d. § 5-604 (c) (2). 
65. [d. § 5-604 (d) (2). 
66. [d. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. § 5-604(d) (3). 
69. [d. § 5-215(a)(l), (2). 
70. [d. § 5-215(d) (3). 
71. Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 70 Md. App. 264, 269-70, 520 A.2d 
1124,1127-28 (1987). See also Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(f) (2003). 
73. [d. 
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with the Human Relations Commission (HRC) for investigation.74 If 
the HRC finds that there is probable cause for believing a retaliatory 
act has been committed, the HRC must first undertake to remedy the 
act by conference, conciliation and persuasion; 75 and if that fails, file a 
complaint with a hearing examiner.76 If the hearing examiner deter-
mines, upon all the evidence, that a discriminatory act has been com-
mitted, Article 49B, section 11 (e) of the Maryland Annotated Code 
provides: 
[T] he remedy may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , 
or any other equitable relief that is deemed appropriate. 
The award of monetary relief shall be limited to a 36-month 
period. The complainant may not be awarded monetary re-
lief for losses incurred between the time of the Commission's 
final determination and the final determination by the cir-
cuit court or higher appellate court, as the case may be. In-
terim earning or amounts earnable with reasonable 
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against 
shall operate to reduce the monetary relief otherwise 
allowable. 77 
"Opposing" a discriminatory employment practice includes protesting 
it internally (internal whistleblowing) as well as filing a complaint with 
the HRC (external whistle blowing) , regardless of whether or not the 
source is a direct victim of a discriminatory practice.78 Section 16(f) 
of the Maryland FEPA79 is based on its federal counterpart, § 2000e-
3(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80 In Chappell v. Southern Maryland 
Hospital, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that "[t]he opposi-
tion ... clauses ... have been liberally applied by the courts to shield 
employees who speak out against an employer's unlawful employment 
• "81 practIces .... 
74. Id. § 9A(a). 
75. Id. § lOeb). 
76. Id. § 11 (a). 
77. Id. § lICe). 
78. See id. § 9A; see also Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 63, 803 
A.2d 482, 496-97 (2002). 
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(f). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001). Maryland courts use federal cases interpret-
ing the federal act for guidance in applying section 16(f) of the Maryland 
Act. See Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 494, 578 A.2d 766, 772 
(1990); see also Ford v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 149 Md. App. 
488,501,817 A.2d 264, 272 (2003). 
81. 320 Md. at 494-95, 578 A.2d at 772-73. The court cited the following 
examples: 
E.E.O.G. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1983) (a 
letter protesting unspecified "racism" and "discrimination" in em-
ployer's practices is a permissible form of protected opposition to 
discriminatory practices); Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 
441 (4th Cir.1981) (female employee who was discharged because 
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In Chappell, the plaintiff, Robert Chappell, claimed that Southern 
Maryland Hospital had fired him in retaliation for his reporting em-
ployment practice violations to hospital senior management.82 The 
court determined that "Chappell can pursue a remedy under both the 
state and federal anti-discrimination statutes for his discharge from 
employment for apprising his employer of allegedly discriminatory 
employment practices."83 
Maryland's anti-discrimination statute does not contain a "provision 
for a private right of action to enforce its prohibition of discrimina-
tion."84 If the complaining employee, however, works for an em-
ployer with fourteen or fewer employees and is dismissed in 
retaliation for opposing employer improprieties, the employee may 
bring a tort of abusive discharge.85 In addition, the Maryland FEPA 
does not authorize direct civil actions by the Commission in circuit 
she complained to her employer about its discriminatory practices 
of soliciting applicants for sales work according to their sex, and by 
limiting the job opportunities and base pay of its female salesper-
sons, was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and salary equal 
to male counterparts, court costs and attorney's fees); Berg v. La 
Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir.1980) ("By protecting 
employees from retaliation, [§ 2000e-3(a)] is designed to en-
courage employees to call to their employers' attention discrimina-
tory practices of which the employer may be unaware or which 
might result in protracted litigation to determine their legality if 
they are not voluntarily changed."); Eichman v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. 
of Trustees, 597 F.2d 11 04 (7th Cir.1979) (plaintiff who alleged that 
he assisted a woman who was trying to exercise her Title VII rights 
to retain her job, and that his discharge was in retaliation for that 
assistance, sufficiently states a claim under § 2000e-3(a)); Jones v. 
Lyng, 669 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (D.D.C. 1986) ("The 'opposition 
clause' protects statements by a person ... who is not himself the 
direct victim of the discriminatory practice but who opposes such 
discrimination against others."); Jenkins v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 
Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D.Tex.1986) (employee who was termi-
nated for telephoning district manager to complain on behalf of 
another employee he believed to be experiencing sexual harass-
ment was protected under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a)); 
Crockwell v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1985) (plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of retalia-
tory discharge under § 2000e-3(a) by showing that her stated objec-
tions to her employer regarding sexual harassment of a co-worker 
most likely prompted her discharge); and Spence v. Local 1250, 
United Auto Workers, 595 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (employee 
who was fired for speaking out against his employer's practices, 
which he believed to be racially discriminatory against a fellow em-
ployee, was participating in protected activity under § 2000e-3(a)). 
Id. 
82. Chappell, 320 Md. at 485-86, 578 A.2d at 768. 
83. Id. at 496, 578 A.2d at 773. 
84. Pritchett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 650 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Md. 1986). 
85. See Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 628-29, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (1996). 
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court; a "plaintiff ordinarily must invoke and exhaust his administra-
tive remed[ies] before maintaining an action."86 
E. Summary of Maryland Whistleblower Statutes 
In summary, Maryland statutes provide a remedy to whistle blowers 
in four specific situations: (1) when an employee of the executive 
branch discloses a violation of the law or abuse of authority or gross 
waste of funds in the executive branch; (2) when licensed health-care 
workers, other than state employees, report or threaten to report ille-
gal activity creating a substantial and specific health threat; (3) when 
an employee discloses a MOSHA violation to MOSHA authorities; and 
(4) when an employee opposes a discriminatory act. Each statute pro-
vides a statutory remedy and a procedure to obtain it. Of these four 
statutes, only the Health Care Act expressly provides a private cause of 
action as the enforcement mechanism.87 Maryland common law rec-
ognizes the availability of the tort of abusive discharge for employees 
injured in violation of its FEPA anti-retaliation provision who work for 
an employer with fourteen or fewer employees.88 
The language in two of the statutes reviewed indicates that they do 
protect internal whistle blowers. Maryland's Health Care Act provides 
a private cause of action to cover health-care workers whose employer 
retaliates against them for threatening to make a disclosure of what 
the employee reasonably believes in good faith to be an illegal act by 
their employer or only for having reported such to a supervisor.89 
The anti-retaliation provision of the FEPA indicates that it is a viola-
tion of the statute for an employer to retaliate against an employee 
who "opposes" internally what the employee in good faith considers to 
be a discriminatory act in violation of the law.90 "Opposing" may be 
no more than internally protesting the allegedly illegal activity. The 
following table compares the four statutes on a number of points: 
86. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Downey Communications Inc., 110 
Md. App. 493, 531, 678 A.2d 55, 74 (1996) (quoting Md.-Nat'l Capital Park 
& Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1,25 n.10, 511 A.2d 1079, 1091 
n.10 (1986)). 
87. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-504 (Supp. 2003); see also supra notes 51-
54 and accompanying text. 
88. Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608, 616 (1996). 
89. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-502. 
90. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B, § 16(f) (2003). 
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Employees Enforcement Disclosure: Disclosure: to 
Statute Covered Process Subject Matter whom 
1. Executive State Execu- Complaint to 1. Abuse of Not specified. 
Employees tive Branch Secretary of authority, 
Whistle-blower Employees Budget and gross waste of 
Protection Act Management money 
with appeal to 2. Specific, 
ALJ and substantial 
Courts danger to 
public health 
or safety 
3. Violation 
of law 
2. Health Licensed or Private cause Specific and Requires in-
Care Workers Board Certi- of action with substantial ternal report-
Whistle-blow- fied Health one year stat- danger to ing before ex-
ers Protection Care Workers ute of limita- public health ternal report-
Act other than tions or safety ing to state 
state employ- board 
ees 
3. OSHA anti- Any employee With 10 days MOSHA viola- External only 
retaliation to Commis- tion of OSHA 
provision sion-er of La- rule 
bor and In-
dustry 
4. FEPA anti- All private If 15 or more Opposing Internal oppo-
retaliation and public employees, to and/or re- sition, exter-
provision sector employ- HRC; if fewer, porting dis- nal reporting 
ees tort of abusive crimina-tory to HRC 
discharge. employment 
practice 
None of these statutory provisions would have benefited any of the 
Time whistleblowers if they had been victims of retaliatory actions by 
employers in the state of Maryland.91 This is because none of the 
whistleblowers were employees of the executive branch of govern-
ment, opposed a discriminatory activity, was a licensed health-care 
worker disclosing a specific and substantial danger to the public safety 
and health, or adversely treated for reporting a MOSHA violation.92 If 
existing Maryland statutory law would not have provided any of them 
with a remedy for an employer retaliatory action, would Maryland 
common law? 
91. See Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, Persons of the Year: Coleen /Wwiey, Cynthia 
Copper, Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 34. 
92. See generally id. Furthermore, none of the whistleblowers were fired for re-
fusing to engage in an illegal act as a condition of employment, for which 
the tort of abusive discharge provides a remedy. See generally id. 
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III. MARYLAND COMMON LAW: WHOLEY V. SEARS, ROEBUCK, & 
CO.:93 THE "EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING" TORT OF ABU-
SIVE DISCHARGE 
The tort of abusive discharge is a common-law theory of recovery 
that provides a remedy when an employer's dismissal of an employee 
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy,94 and the source of that 
policy does not provide a remedy.95 Typical examples include when 
an employer fires an employee in retaliation for the employee's re-
fusal to commit an illegal act at the command of the employer,96 to 
forego the exercise of a legal right,97 or to forego the exercise of an 
important civic duty.98 This tort also arises when an employer's moti-
vation contravenes Maryland anti-discrimination laws that do not pro-
vide a statutory remedy.99 
A. Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. 
Sears employed Mr. Wholey for twenty-four years as a security of-
ficer, and during most of that time he was simultaneously employed as 
a law enforcement officer. lOo His duties included "investigating suspi-
cious behavior and reporting thefts of the store's merchandise by both 
93. 370 Md. 38,803 A.2d 482 (2002). 
94. See Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 629, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (1996). 
While the source of a claimed public policy might be a constitution, a stat-
ute, administrative regulations, or common-law decisions, the public policy 
must be clearly mandated to serve as the basis for a wrongful discharge 
action because the clarity of the mandate "limits judicial forays into the 
wilderness of discerning 'public policy' without clear direction from a legis-
lative or regulatory source." Milton v. lIT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
95. See Porterfield v. Masari II, Inc., 142 Md. App. 134, 141, 788 A.2d 242, 245-
46 (2002). 
96. Kesslerv. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 589-90, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-
51 (1990) (holding wrongful discharge action lies for termination of at-will 
employee for refusal to violate apartment tenant's right to privacy). 
97. See Erwing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 48, 50, 437 A.2d 1173, 1174-75 
(1988) (holding abusive discharge claim lies for terminating employee 
solely for filing worker's compensation claim). 
98. See Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs. of Baltimore, Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 
135, 140, 632 A.2d 463, 469, 471-72 (1993) (Finding that a wrongful dis-
charge claim will lie for termination of an employee who carries out a statu-
tory duty to report child abuse or neglect). 
99. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 630, 636-37, 672 A.2d at 613-14,616 (holding that 
where an employer had fewer than fifteen employees the tort of abusive 
discharge was available to employees to remedy gender based discharge be-
cause of lack of statutory remedy). See also John A. Gray, Statutory Workforce 
Size Requirement and the Tort of Abusive Discharge: Small Emplayers Beware, 47 
lAB. LJ. 13, 15 (1996) [hereinafter Abusive Discharge]; John A. Gray, 
Workforce Size and Remedies for Discrimination in Emplayment: Wrongful Discharge 
and Future Possibilities, 15 MIDWEST L. REv. 79 (1997) [hereinafter Wrongful 
Discharge] . 
100. Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 43, 803 A.2d 482, 484-85 
(2002). 
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customers and employees."101 Mr. Wholey reported to his Sears su-
pervisor what appeared to be repeated thefts of company property by 
a store manager and was authorized to install a sUlveillance camera in 
the suspect's office.102 Subsequently, he was ordered to remove the 
camera and was fired shortly thereafter. 103 Mr. Wholey contended 
that Sears fired him in retaliation for investigating and reporting the 
store manager's suspected criminal activity and filed a wrongful dis-
charge claim.l04 Sears contended that it fired Mr. Wholey for failing 
to perform his duties the prior winter during a blizzard. l05 
At trial, Sears argued that there was no clear mandate of public pol-
icy in Maryland that favored the investigation of criminal activity; 
therefore, Mr. Wholey's termination did not violate public policy, and 
was not actionable as a matter of law. 106 The trial court disagreed with 
this argument holding that Maryland public policy favors the investi-
gation and prosecution of crimes.107 The jury returned a verdict 
against Sears on Mr. Wholey's wrongful discharge claim and awarded 
$166,000 in damages. 108 . 
B. Court oj Special Appeals. 
A threejudge panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
reversed the judgment of the trial court and unanimously held that 
Sears had violated no clear mandate of public policy when it termi-
nated Mr. Wholey.lOg On appeal, Sears relied on the Fourth Circuit's 
reasoning in Adler v. American Standard Corporation ("Adler III").1 10 In 
Adler III, the court considered whether an employer violates Maryland 
public policy when it terminates an employee in retaliation for his 
disclosure of wrongdoing to higher corporate officers. I II The court 
held "that, while the public policy of Maryland clearly proscribes ter-
minating an at-will employee for refusing to engage in illegal activity 
or for complying with, or stating an intention to fulfill, a statutorily 
101. [d. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 44-45, 803 A.2d at 485. 
104. [d. at 46,803 A.2d at 486. In Maryland, "wrongful discharge" is used inter-
changeably with "abusive discharge" and "retaliatory discharge" to refer to 
the tort of abusive discharge. Lora Holmberg Hess & Lisa J. Kahn, Survey: 
Developments in Maryland Law, 1990-1991, 51 MD. L. REv. 681, 682 n.18 
(1992). 
105. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 Md. App. 642, 647, 779 A.2d 408, 411 
(2001), affd, 370 Md. 38,803 A.2d 482 (2002). 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 648, 779 A.2d at 411. 
108. [d. at 642, 779 A.2d at 408. 
109. [d. at 663, 779 A.2d at 420. 
1lO. [d. at 648-49, 779 A.2d at 412 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 
1303 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
Ill. See Adler, 830 F.2d at 1303. 
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prescribed duty, it did not proscribe terminating such an employee 
for 'whistle blowing.' "112 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated: 
In the absence of a clear declaration by [the Maryland] legis-
lature or the Maryland Court of Appeals that an action for 
[wrongful] discharge should be extended to situations where 
the discharged employee claims to have had the knowledge 
and intent to report wrongdoing to a higher corporate offi-
cial, this court should not create such a ruling . . .. [The 
plaintiff's] allegations and evidence reveal nothing more 
than his discharge resulting from his intention to blow the 
whistle on illegal activities condoned by his supervisors ... 
and their efforts to protect themselves by discharging him. 
This ... does not involve an effort by [the plaintiff] to fulfill 
a statutorily rsrescribed duty nor his failure to engage in ille-
gal activity. 1 3 
While Sears relied on Adler III to support its argument on appeal, 
Mr. Wholey relied on the Illinois case of Palmateer v. International Har-
vester. 114 In Palmateer, an at-will employee reported suspected criminal 
activity by a co-employee to the police, and offered to assist them in 
the investigation and trial. II 5 
When his employer learned of this, [he was fired]. In a 
[four] to [three] decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
held that terminating an at-will employee for reporting a 
crime to the authorities is contrary to the 'clear public policy 
favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses,' 
and therefore gives rise to a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 1 16 
Adler III explained that the plaintiff had no statutory legal duty 
under Maryland law to report suspected criminal activity and the em-
ployer did not require the employee to engage in any unlawful activ-
ity.1l7 In contrast, Palmateer sustained a cause of action for an external 
whistle blower even in the absence of any statutory duty to report crim-
inal activity or any employer requirement to commit illegal activity. I IS 
112. Sears, IWebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 653,779 A.2d at 414 (discussing Adler, 
830 F.2d at 1306-07). 
113. Adler, 830 F.2d at 1307. In Wholey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ac-
knowledged the correctness of the Fourth Circuit's application in Adler III 
and in Milton. See Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 69 n.18, 807 
A.2d 482, 500 n.18 (2002). "The Fourth Circuit refused to find a violation 
of Maryland public policy for 'whistle-blowing,' particularly when the em-
ployee had no legal duty to report the criminal activity." Id. (quoting Milton v. 
lIT Research, Inc., 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
114. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981). 
115. Id. at 127. 
116. Sears, IWebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 654-55,779 A.2d at 415-16 (discussing 
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880). 
117. See Adler, 830 F.2d at 1307. 
118. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 881. 
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Mter reviewing the cases on which the parties relied on appeal, the 
court of special appeals then discussed Milton v. lIT Research Insti-
tute. 119 "In Milton, the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, adhered 
to its holding in Adler III that discharging an at-will employee for 
'whistle-blowing' is not a violation of a clearly mandated Maryland 
public policy, unless the employee had a legal duty to report the crim-
inal activity."120 In Milton, the employee became convinced that the 
corporation was engaging in illegal schemes to avoid reporting taxa-
ble income to the IRS, and reported his concerns to management.121 
When his superiors failed to rectify the problem, he reported his con-
cerns to the chairman of the board. 122 His superiors then demoted 
him.123 When he complained, they fired him.124 Applying Maryland 
law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the 
plaintiff did not and could not allege that he was fired for refusing to 
engage in unlawful activities himself or that he had a statutory duty to 
disclose the company's wrongdoing to its board. 125 The court stated 
that: 
Milton argues that his fiduciary obligations as an officer of 
IITRI supply the legal duty. . . . The broad fiduciary obliga-
tions of "care and loyalty" are simply too general to qualify as 
a specific legal duty that will support the claim that his dis-
charge violates a "clear mandate of public policy."126 
Based on its acceptance of the Adler III and Milton decisions, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in deciding Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., concluded: 
The conduct at issue in this case is one employee's act of 
investigating possible theft from his employer by a co-em-
ployee. Nothing in Maryland's general theft statute or any 
other enactment mandates that a citizen of Maryland who 
suspects that another person (co-employee or otherwise) 
may have committed a theft must report, let alone investi-
gate, that suspicion. To be sure, it might serve the public 
good for citizens to look into possible criminal acts of others, 
including co-employees, and report their suspicions to the 
authorities. We do not subscribe to the view, however, that 
conduct we might think would promote the good of society 
as a whole is, because we think so, favored public policy of 
this State. To find a clear mandate of public policy, we must 
119. 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998). 
120. Sears, Rnebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 657, 779 A.2d at 416-17 (discussing 
Milton, 138 F.3d at 519). 
121. Milton, 138 F.3d at 521. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. at 521-23. 
126. Id. at 523. 
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look to already existing sources of policy expression. In the 
absence of any legislative or existing judicial pronouncement 
in this state directing private citizens to investigate possible 
acts of theft by co-workers or others, we find no origin for 
the public policy essential to Wholey's wrongful discharge 
claim.127 
... In Maryland, we have found a clear mandate of public 
policy in favor of reporting possible criminal conduct of 
others to the authorities when, by statute, a person is re-
quired to make such a report. There was no such statutory 
directive in this case. 128 
c. Court oj Appeals oj Maryland 
243 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the availability of the 
tort of abusive discharge in the absence of any legal duty to report. 129 
There were three opinions: (1) a plurality of three judges creating a 
new application of the tort of abusive discharge for external 
whistle blowing, but rejecting its application to the plaintiff-employee 
internal whistleblower;13o (2) a second opinion by two judges concur-
ring in the judgment against the plaintiff, but rejecting the reasoning 
of the plurality;131 and (3) two dissenting judges asserting a broader 
scope for the tort's availability, implicitly inclusive of the plurality'S 
position but going beyond it.132 
The two principal issues were whether Maryland recognized the 
availability of the tort of abusive discharge to provide a remedy for 
whistleblowers and, if so, whether or not it was available to the plain-
tiff-discharged employee.133 
The decisional issue before this Court is whether Maryland 
recognizes a common law public policy exception to the at-
will-employee-doctrine whereby discharging an employee for 
investigating and reporting the suspected criminal activity of 
a co-worker would constitute a wrongful discharge. We con-
clude that a clear public policy mandate exists in the State of 
127. Sears, Rnebuck & Co., 139 Md. App. at 661, 779 A.2d at 419. 
128. Id. at 662, 779 A.2d at 419-20. For example, Maryland Family Law Article 
provisions and implementing regulations require specific professionals and 
law enforcement personnel to report suspected child abuse or neglect to 
state authorities. See Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs. of Baltimore, 98 
Md. App. 123, 135-46,632 A.2d 463, 469-75 (1993). Firing an employee for 
complying with these requirements constitutes the tort of abusive discharge 
because neither the statute creating the obligation nor its implementing 
regulations provide a civil remedy for violations. Id. 
129. See Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 70-71, 803 A.2d 482, 501 
(2002) (plurality opinion). 
130. See id. at 63-67, 803 A.2d at 496-99 (plurality opinion). 
131. See id. at 71-76, 803 A.2d at 501-04 (concurring opinion). 
132. See id. at 76-77, 803 A.2d at 504-05 (dissenting opinion). 
133. See id. at 48, 803 A.2d at 487. 
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Maryland which protects employees from a termination 
based upon the reporting of suspected criminal activities to 
the appropriate law enforcement authorities. While we rec-
ognize such an exception, the petitioner's actions in this 
case, i.e. the investigation of suspected criminal activity of a 
store manager and reporting of that susEicion to his supervi-
sors, do not qualify for this exception. 1 4 
Five of the seven judges held that the tort was available for external 
whistleblowers;135 three of these, only for external whistleblowers;136 
and the other two for all whistleblowers. 137 The remaining two judges 
completely rejected the availability of the tort for any 
whistleblowers. 138 
Is there a Is the tort 
clear mandate of available to 
public policy? this plaintiff? 
Plurality (3) Yes. No. 
Concurring in result. (2) No. No. 
Dissenting (2) Yes, but in a Yes. 
wider sense. 
Before resolving whether the tort of abusive discharge provided a 
remedy for whistle blowers, the court of appeals had to answer two 
questions: First, whether there was a clear mandate of public policy in 
Maryland in favor of reporting suspected criminal activity; and, sec-
ond, whether there was a statutory remedy available. 139 
The plurality found the clear mandate of public policy in a state 
criminal statute not even discussed by the lower courts. 140 An "ex-
press statutory mandate" makes it a misdemeanor offense for a person 
"who harms or injures another's person or property in retaliation for 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484. 
See id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484 (plurality opinion) (Battaglia, Cathell, & Har-
rell,lJ.); id. at 76,803 A.2d at 504 (dissenting opinion) (Eldrige,j. & Bell, 
C].). 
See id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501 (plurality opinion) (Battaglia, Cathell, & Har-
rell,lJ.). See also infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 76, 803 A.2d at 503 (dissenting opinion) (Eldrige,j. 
& Bell, CJ.). See infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text. 
See WhoUry, 370 Md. 72-73,803 A.2d at 502 (concurring opinion) (Raker & 
Wilner,lJ.). See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text. 
See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 48, 803 A.2d at 487. 
See id. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 
139 Md. App. 642, 648, 661, 779 A.2d 408, 411, 419 (1999), affd, 370 Md. 
38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002) (indicating no reference to a state criminal statute 
by the court of special appeals or the trial court). 
2004] Whistleblower Protection in the State of Maryland 245 
reporting a crime."141 Section 9-303 of the Criminal Law Article of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland provides: 
(a) Prohibited. - A person may not intentionally harm an-
other or damage or destroy property with the intent of 
retaliating against a victim or witness for: 
(1) giving testimony in an official proceeding; or 
(2) reporting a crime or delinquent act. 
(b) Penalty. - A person who violates this section is guilty 
of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to 
imprisonment not exceeding five years.142 
Further, any person who "has reported a crime or delinquent act to a 
law enforcement officer, prosecutor, intake officer, correctional of-
ficer, or judicial officer" pursuant to section 9-301 (d) (3) of the Crimi-
nal Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland is considered a 
witness against whom retaliation for reporting a crime is 
prohibited. 143 
For the plurality, this statutory protection for witnesses of a crime 
implied a public policy in favor of reporting criminal activity to public 
authorities. 144 The plurality observed that "[f]rom these statutory pro-
visions, a clearly definable public policy goal is derived: the Legisla-
ture sought to protect those witnesses who report suspected criminal 
activity to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial authority from being 
harmed for performing this important public task."145 
Because this statute provided only a criminal penalty to a dis-
charged whisdeblower, the plurality concluded that the tort was availa-
ble to provide a civil cause of action. 146 The court thus held that 
141. VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 762 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.». 
142. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 9-303 (2002) (corresponds to former MD. 
ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 762 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., Supp. 2001». 
143. Id. § 9-301 (e) (corresponds to former MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 760(d) (3». 
144. See VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
145. Id. The court noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized a similar 
public policy favoring employee-informants in a 1988 case, in which it 
based its public policy exception on a statute similar to Maryland's. Id. at 
59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.18 (citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 
S.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Ark. 1988». 
146. See VVhoUry, 370 Md. at 59-60,803 A.2d at 494 (Battaglia,]., plurality) ("[W]e 
now conclude that while Section 762 creates a criminal cause against those 
who retaliate against witnesses who report crimes, the tort of wrongful dis-
charge provides a civil remedy."). This recognition of a clear mandate of 
public policy is similar to that in Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, in which 
the court of appeals recognized a clear mandate of public policy in the 
criminal prohibition of solicitation of prostitution as a basis for the tort of 
abusive discharge in circumstances where repeated, unwelcome sexual pro-
positions by a foreman resulted in a constructive discharge of the em-
ployee. 359 Md. 560, 573, 755 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2000). Instead of pursuing 
a statutory remedy under federal or state anti-discrimination in employ-
ment laws, the plaintiff chose to seek a common law tort remedy. Id. See 
also John A. Gray, Sexual Harrassment, Prostitution, and the Tort of Abusive Dis-
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"terminating employment on the grounds that the employee (as a vic-
tim or witness) ... reported a suspected crime to the appropriate law en-
forcement or judicial officer is wrongful and contrary to public 
policy."147 Theoretically, the state could have prosecuted whoever 
fired Mr. Wholey for a criminal violation; and, if Mr. Wholey had re-
ported the suspected theft to the police, he could have sued his em-
ployer, although not the supervisory co-employee, for wrongful 
discharge. 148 
On the issue of whether the tort was available to all whistle blowers , 
internal and external, the plurality rejected its availability to internal 
whistleblowers. I49 While noting that other states had done SO,IS0 the 
plurality refused because the state legislature enacted whistle blower 
protection only for employees reporting violations to public enforce-
ment authorities. 151 
In the limited times that the Legislature has enacted whis-
tle-blower protection to protect private employees, the pro-
tection is only valid when the employee/whistle-blower 
reports the suspect activity externally. For example, Section 
5-604(b) of the Labor and Employment Article protects an 
employee who files a complaint or brings an action for viola-
tions of the Occupational Safety and Health title by his or 
her employer. Maryland's anti-discrimination laws protect 
charge: An Analysis and Evaluation of Recent Legal Developments, 9 BUFF. WOo 
MEN'S LJ. 169, 181 (2001). Similarly, the court of appeals recognized the 
availability of the tort when an employee was discharged solely because the 
employee filed a worker's compensation claim, because the law created a 
criminal cause against the employer but no civil remedy for the victim. See 
Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197,200-02, 586 A.2d 1275, 
1277-78 (1991) (citing Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 
(1988». 
147. WhoUry, 370 Md. at 61, 803 A.2d at 495. The tort of abusive discharge pro-
vides a remedy for the violation of a clear mandate of public policy in situa-
tions where a remedy is not otherwise available: "The first limiting factor 
with respect to adopting a 'new' public policy mandate for a wrongful dis-
charge claim is derived from the generally accepted purpose behind recog-
nizing the tort in the first place: to provide a remedy for an otherwise 
unremedied violation of public policy." Id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 490 (Battag-
lia,]., plurality). 
148. [d. at 59-60,803 A.2d at 494. See also Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 14, 
494 A.2d 212,218-19 (1985) (holding that a tort claim of action was availa-
ble to a plaintiff employee when fired for refusing to take a lie detector test 
when a state statute prohibited such a demand), superseded !Jy MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 100, § 95; Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. 
Co., 86 Md. App. 533, 542, 587 A.2d 569, 573 (1990) (explaining that MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95, as amended, provides a statutory cause of action 
for employees wrongfully discharged for refusing a polygraph test and codi-
fied the common law tort). 
149. See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496-97 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
150. Id. at 63 n.15, 803 A.2d at 496 n.15 (Battaglia,]., plurality) (citing Sullivan 
v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 724-25 (D. Conn. 1992». 
151. See WhoUry, 370 Md. at 67-68,803 A.2d at 499-500 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
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private employees who have opposed any unlawful discrimi-
natory practice in which the employer engages, or reported 
... the employer's discriminatory practices. See Md. Code, 
Art. 4gB, § 16(f). Similarly, with respect to Article 27, Sec-
tion 762, the Legislature created a clear and unmistakable 
prohibition against retaliating against a person who reports 
criminal activity, externally, to the appropriate law enforce-
ment authorities. We believe a corresponding common law 
cause of action must also require external reporting to the 
appropriate law enforcement authorities. 152 
We refuse to take the specific factual circumstance before us 
and induce from it an all-encompassing exception ... which 
declares that the act of investigating criminal activity is a per se 
public benefit, the termination for which, is actionable in 
tort law. Our legislature has declined to encroach upon the 
employment decisions of private companies through crea-
tion of a general all-encompassing "whistleblower protec-
tion" statute which would protect employees who investigate 
and internally report suspected criminal activity; we, in turn, 
decline to act in its stead .... We similarly limit the public 
policy exception to those who report criminal activity to the 
appropriate authorities. 153 
247 
In sum, protecting internal whistleblowers is not the public policy in 
the state of Maryland, but protecting external whistle blowers is. Mter 
addressing the principal issues of the case, the plurality next ad-
dressed Mr. Wholey's two contentions.154 First, Mr. Wholey argued 
that when investigating employee theft at Sears, he was acting not 
merely as a Sears security officer but in his capacity as sworn deputy 
sheriff. 155 The court rejected this argument on the grounds that Mr. 
Wholey was merely fulfilling the specific private employment duty of 
protecting the private proprietary interests of Sears, for which he was 
hired, and did not face any specific legal risk for failing to pursue his 
employer's requested investigation of employee thefts. 156 
The court next addressed Mr. Wholey's second argument-that he 
was acting in the public good by investigating criminal activity: 
Nor can [Mr. Wholey] seek protection from an esoteric 
theory about acting in the "public good" by investigating 
criminal activity. The public good is best served by reporting 
suspected criminal activity to law enforcement authorities; an 
action which [Mr. Wholey]. . . did not take . . . . Further-
152. Id. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496-97 (Battaglia, j., plurality) (footnote omitted). 
153. Id. at 67-68, 803 A.2d 499-500 (Battaglia, j., plurality). 
154. See id. at 63-67, 803 A.2d at 497-99. 
155. See id. at 63-64, 803 A.2d at 497. 
156. See id. at 64-65, 803 A.2d at 497-98. 
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more, we decline to create a tort cause of action based solely 
on transcendental notions of that which is in the public in-
terest, particularly when our own Legislature has declined to 
make individual citizens criminally resr,onsible for failing to 
investigate or report criminal activity. 1 7 
The plurality then revisited the precedents primarily relied on by 
the parties on appeal.158 Mr. Wholey relied primarily on the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Palmateer. 159 While acknowledging 
that the public reporting public policy exception created by the Illi-
nois court twenty years earlier is the same as that created by the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland in the instant case, the plurality criticized the 
way in which the Palmateer court reached its decision. 160 Specifically, 
the plurality stated: 
The Palmateer court based its holding entirely on abstract no-
tions of that which constitutes the public good. [S]uch a pol-
icy mandate was unsupported by any legislative enactment 
and was grounded only in the obscure belief that public pol-
icy insists that all citizens become crime-fighters. The "ends" 
may be similar, but the "means" by which we achieve those 
ends are vastly different. 
Our decision today is grounded in, and supported by, a 
legislative enactment from which a public policy clearly 
emanates. 161 
The plurality then proceeded to discuss the court's previous deci-
sion in Adler III, on which Sears primarily relied on appeal. 162 The 
WhoUy court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the availabil-
ity of the tort of abusive discharge to provide a remedy to internal 
whistleblowers in Adler III and Milton. 163 
Adler III and Milton preclude the availability of the tort of abusive 
discharge for termination motivated by "public reporting" on the 
grounds that the tort is available only when the plaintiff has refused to 
commit an illegal act or has a statutory duty to report illegal activity.164 
WhoUy, however, expands this limited application. "The critical distin-
guishing factor between Adler [III] and [Wholry] is that at the time 
157. [d. at 65-66, 803 A.2d at 498. If Mr. Wholey had reported the suspected 
criminal activity to the local police district and was fired for doing so, he 
would have had a viable abusive discharge cause of action. [d. at 70, 803 
A.2d at 500-01. 
158. [d. at 66, 68-69, 803 A.2d at 498, 500 (Battaglia, J., plurality). 
159. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); Wholey, 370 Md. at 66,803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia, 
J., plurality). 
160. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 66-67, 803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia, J., plurality). 
161. [d. at 66-67,803 A.2d at 498-499 (Battaglia,J., plurality) (citations omitted). 
162. See id. at 68-69, 803 A.2d at 500 (Battaglia, J., plurality); see also supra notes 
110-113 and accompanying text. 
163. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 69 n.18, 70, 803 A.2d at 500-01 n.18. 
164. See id. 
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Adler [III] was decided, the [Maryland] legislature had not [yet] en-
acted the [statutory] provision prohibiting retaliation against a witness 
for reporting a crime."165 Therefore, the court observed, "no public 
policy mandate regarding the reporting of criminal activity was dis-
cernible."166 As for Milton, while it was decided five years after the 
enactment of the 1993 misdemeanor "witness protection" statute, the 
Fourth Circuit continued to rely on the guidance provided by the 
court of appeals in the first Adler case ("Adler /'), and the facts of the 
case did not require it to address a remedy for external 
whistleblowers. 167 
On the one hand, the plurality's position is an acceptance of 
Palmateer's outcome with a rejection of its "abstract" un-rooted ap-
proach to the source of its public policy.168 On the other hand, the 
plurality affirmed Adler I's rejection of an internal whistleblowing abu-
sive discharge tort while at the same time expanding the scope of the 
availability of the tort in light of the 1993 misdemeanor witness pro-
tection statute and thereby creating a new external whistle blower abu-
sive discharge tort. 169 
In conclusion, the plurality stated: 
Again, while no legal duty to report criminal activity exists in 
Maryland, at least with respect to the factual circumstances 
before us, the Legislature has determined that one who re-
ports criminal activity to appropriate authorities should be 
statutorily protected from retaliation for such conduct. 
Therefore, we conclude that a public policy mandate exists 
for employees who report criminal activity to the appropriate 
authorities and are subsequently discharged from employ-
ment on this basis. We decline petitioner's invitation to 
adopt a broader public policy mandate for conduct encom-
passing the investigation of suspected criminal activity of an 
employee, being of the opinion that such a significant 
change in our law is best left to the Legislature. 17o 
In his very brief dissenting opinion,Judge Eldridge, joined by Chief 
Judge Bell, dissented in two aspects: First, from the plurality's holding 
that the tort was not available to Mr. Wholey; and, second, from the 
plurality's restriction of the availability of the tort only to external 
165. Id. at 69, 803 A.2d at 500. 
166. Id. 
167. See id. at 69 n.18, 803 A.2d at 500 n.18 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Co., 
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland also 
explained that changes in the Maryland Criminal Code had distinguished 
its answer to a certified question from the federal district court in Maryland 
that guided the Fourth Circuit's decision in Adler. Id. 
168. See id. at 66,803 A.2d at 498 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
169. Id. at 70, 803 A.2d at 500-01 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
170. Id. 
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whistle blowers. 171 All that is needed, the dissent stated, is "a suffi-
ciently clear mandate of public policy to support [the plaintiff's] ... 
cause of action."172 According to the dissent, the enactments by the 
General Assembly protecting various categories of "employee-
whistle blowers" "furnish a sufficiently clear mandate" in the instant 
case.173 In addition, the dissenting judges expressed their continued 
disagreement with "the extremely narrow scope which majorities of 
this court have repeatedly accorded the tort of abusive discharge .... 
It is illogical to recognize a tort action and then hold that virtually 
nothing falls within the action."174 The dissent does not expressly 
state its agreement with the plurality'S recognition of the "public re-
porting" tort, but their concurrence is implicit in their argument for a 
wider availability. 
In her concurring opinion, Judge Raker, joined by Judge Wilner, 
affirmed the denial of the tort to Mr. Wholey on the basis of "the well-
reasoned opinion of the Court of Special Appeals."175 The concur-
rence rejected the availability of the tort for any whistleblowing for 
two reasons. First, the case itself was "not ripe for such decision."176 
In the concurring judge's view, there was no need to recognize the 
availability of the tort for external whistleblowers because Mr. Wholey 
was only an internal whistleblower.177 No more was required from the 
court, the concurrence argued, than its rejection of the availability of 
the tort for this purpose. 178 Second, the concurrence rejected the 
availability of the tort because the statute on which the plurality relied 
171. Id. at 76, 803 A.2d at 504 (Eldridge, j., dissenting). While future wrongful 
discharge tort appeal decisions are difficult to predict, it is important to 
note that Judge Eldridge retired from the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
2003. His replacement, Judge Clayton Greene, Jr. from the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland, was appointed in January of 2004. 
172. Wholey, 370 Md. at 76, 803 A.2d at 504 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). 
173. Id. The four statutory enactments discussed in the first part of this article 
would probably satisfy the "sufficiently clear mandate" standard. See supra 
Part II. 
174. Wholey, 370 Md. at 76-77, 803 A.2d at 504-05 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). Asso-
ciate Judge Eldridge's position has been stated in earlier cases. For exam-
ple, the dissent in Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d 766 
(1990), in which Judge Eldridge joined, argued that "the adoption of lim-
ited administrative remedies for employment discrimination does not indi-
cate a legislative intent to preclude a common law action in which much 
more comprehensive relief can be obtained." Id. at 500, 578 A.2d at 775 
(Adkins, Ret.]., dissenting). 
175. Wholey, 370 Md. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501 (Raker,]., concurring). 
176. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring). 
177. See id. at 71-72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring). 
178. See id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker,]., concurring). First, Mr. Wholey 
argued that the tort should be available to all whistle blowers, internal and 
external; and second, if restricted only to external, then the fact that while 
employed by Sears he was simultaneously employed as a county Deputy 
Sheriff made him an external whistleblower. See id. at 63-64, 803 A.2d at 
497 (Battaglia, j., plurality). 
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"does not place any duty upon an employee and is not an expression 
of clearly mandated public policy that would support the exception 
created . . . ." 1 79 
[T]he plurality's reading of the statute expands the class of 
people protected under § 762, which only protects a "victim 
or witness" who [gives testimony or] reports a crime. Under 
the plurality opinion, the protection of the statute applies to 
any employee who reports suspected criminal activity to the 
appropriate law enforcement officials, irrespective of 
whether there is a duty to report, or whether the employee 
was a testifYing victim or witness. 180 
IV. COMMENTS 
A. Are Internal Whistleblowers Ever Protected Under Maryland Law? 
There is a question about the correctness of the Wholey plurality's 
assertion that" [i) n the limited times that the Legislature has enacted 
whistle-blower protection to protect private employees, the protection 
is only valid when the employee/whistle-blower reports the suspect ac-
tivity externally."181 As the plurality states, MOSHA provides protec-
tion only to those employees who are external whistleblowers. I82 Two 
Maryland statutes, however, provide remedies to private employees 
who are only internal whistle blowers. Article 49B, the Maryland 
FEPA, creates a remedy for an employee who suffers employment re-
taliation simply because the employee has internally opposed a dis-
crimination practice even when the opposing employee is not the 
victim of the discriminatory action. 183 If the employer has fIfteen or 
more employees, the employee may fIle a complaint with the Mary-
land HRC and follow its administrative procedures to get the statutory 
remedies. I84 If the employer has less than fIfteen employees, and the 
employee is the victim of retaliatory discharge-whether actual or 
constructive-then the employee has a tort cause of action. I85 Fur-
179. Id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, j., concurring). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496 (Battaglia, j., plurality). 
182. See id. 
183. See supra Part II.D. 
184. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15 (2003) (defining "employer" for purposes 
ofFEPA as a business of fifteen or more employees); see id. § 9A (describing 
the procedure by which an aggrieved employee can file a complaint with 
the HRC). 
185. Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608,616 (1996) (hold-
ing that the tort of abusive discharge is available to remedy gender-based 
discharge by employers with fewer than fifteen employees). See also Gray, 
Abusive Discharge supra note 99, at 15; Gray, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 
99, at 82-85. 
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ther, the Maryland Health Care Workers Whistleblower Protection Act 
expressly creates a remedy for internal whistleblowing.186 
While the Wholty court accurately asserted that the Maryland "legis-
lature has declined to encroach upon the employment decisions of 
private companies through creation of a general all-encompassing 
'whistleblower protection' statute which would protect employees who 
investigate and internally report suspected criminal activity,"187 it is 
also true that the Maryland General Assembly has so intruded with 
two of the three whistleblower statutes that it has enacted to protect 
private sector employees. 188 As for the three Time whistleblowers, 
none would have had any remedy under Maryland common law if 
their employers had retaliated against them for reporting their con-
cerns internally because none of the three had reported suspected 
criminal activity to a public enforcement authority. 
B. Employer Defenses: Intentional Falsehood, Alternative Reason 
In addition to the defense of a legitimate, alternative reason for an 
adverse employment decision, the employer may also claim that the 
employee's report was an intentional falsehood. 189 Generally, to pre-
vail on a claim of retaliatory discharge, a whistleblower must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he made a good faith re-
port of his employer's suspected criminal activity to an enforcement 
authority; (2) the employer took an adverse action (discharge) against 
him; and (3) the sole reason he was fired was because he made the 
report. 190 The intentional falsehood defense may counter the first 
standard element of a retaliatory discharge claim-that the employee 
made a good faith report of suspected criminal activity.191 The Wholty 
plurality asserted the lack of protection for those who knowingly make 
a false disclosure: 192 
Of course, the protection afforded to those who report 
criminal activity would be eliminated should such report 
prove to be false, in accordance with Article 27 Section 150 
(a), which provides: 
A person may not make a false statement, report, or 
complaint, or cause a false statement, report, or complaint 
to be made, to any peace or police officer of this State, ... 
of any county, city or other political subdivision of this 
186. See supra notes 53-54, 70 and accompanying text. 
187. Wholey, 370 Md. at 67, 803 A.2d at 499. 
188. The other statute, the Maryland Whistleblower Law, provides protection 
only to employees of the state government's executive branch. See supra 
Part II.A. 
189. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
190. See, e.g., Blackburn v. UPS, Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1999); Duvall v. 
Tex. Dept. of Human Servs., 802 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 2002). 
191. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 59 n.13, 803 A.2d at 494 n.13 (Battaglia,]., plurality). 
192. [d. 
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State, ... or any material part thereof, to be false and with 
intent to deceive and with intent to cause an investigation 
or other action to be taken as a result thereof. 
The Legislature's strong public interest in prohibiting false 
police reports ... clearly supercedes any concern for retalia-
tory discharges that may ensue as a result of these false 
reports. 193 
253 
As long as the employer cannot prove that employee has intentionally 
and knowingly made a false report to enforcement authorities, the 
fact that the substance of the disclosure is established to be false is 
generally not sufficient to defeat a claim of retaliatory discharge.194 A 
larger challenge for the employer is to seek to defeat the third ele-
ment of the retaliatory discharge claim-that the dismissal was caused 
by the whistleblowing-by introducing evidence of other legitimate 
reasons for the dismissal that, standing alone, would have resulted in 
dismissal. 195 
C. Other Retaliatory Actions 
The four Maryland statutes previously discussed provide a remedy 
for any adverse retaliatory action. The "external whistle blower" tort of 
abusive discharge, on the other hand, provides a remedy only when 
the retaliatory action is a discharge, actual or constructive.196 If the 
adverse action is another retaliatory action-such as a demotion, a 
change to less desirable assignments or work circumstances, or other 
action less than dismissal-then there is generally no remedy for the 
whistleblower. 197 Yet the prohibited employer motivation is identi-
cal-discriminating against an employee for reporting to public en-
193. 
194. 
195. 
196. 
197. 
Id. 
See Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000) ("While 
there need not be an actual violation of law, the reported conduct must at 
least implicate a violation of law."). Also, although the courts will tolerate 
an erroneous claim of suspected criminal activity, they generally will not 
tolerate a claim made out of bad faith. Id. at 202. 
The Maryland legislature allows the state to defend itself from a 
whistle blower claim by asserting that an adverse action against a state exec-
utive branch employee would have been taken regardless of the employee's 
disclosure of information. MD. CODE ANN, STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302 
(1997 & Supp. 2003) (providing that the subtitle "does not preclude action 
for defamation or invasion of privacy" and that the subtitle "does not pro-
hibit a personnel action that would have been taken regardless of a disclo-
sure of information"). 
Under Maryland law, an actual discharge is an express dismissal by the em-
ployer; a constructive discharge occurs when an employee quits under hos-
tile or abusive circumstances that the employer deliberately created to 
cause the employee to involuntarily resign. See Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l M-
fairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 649-51, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201-02 (1984). 
See Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 467-68, 497 A.2d 159, 172 
(1985) (stating that discharge is the first element for abusive discharge), 
overruled on other grounds by Harford County v. Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 704 
A.2d 421 (1998). 
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forcement authorities employer-controlled conduct as suspected 
criminal activity. There is no principled basis for not recognizing a 
tort cause of action whenever any employer adverse conduct is retalia-
tory.198 The absence of a comprehensive tort provides a perverse in-
centive to an employer to retaliate by punishing an employee in ways 
other than by firing the employee so long as the employer's conduct 
does not amount to a constructive discharge. 
V. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATION 
A. Wisdom of Encouraging Internal Whistleblowers 
Two Maryland statutes protect two kinds of internal whistleblowers: 
those who internally oppose discriminatory practices199 and those who 
report violations of the law that constitute specific and substantial in-
jury to the public health and safety.200 The Wholry plurality acknowl-
edged that a case can be made for the protection of internal 
whistleblowing.201 The plurality ultimately concluded, however, that 
its common law power with regard to the tort of abusive discharge was 
restricted by the requirement of a clear mandate of public policy es-
tablished by the legislature.202 The plurality stated: 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
We acknowledge that some jurisdictions find the distinc-
tion between internal investigating and external reporting to 
be irrelevant. For example, in Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. Co, 802 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1992), the federal 
court, in a prospective opinion concerning Massachusetts 
law, considered the whistle-blowing claim of a former em-
ployee . . . . The employer contended that the plaintiff had 
not made a sufficient claim because the suspected violations 
were not reported to outside authorities, and the plaintiff 
never threatened to speak of the suspected violations to any 
authorities. . . . The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding 
that internal whistleblowing was sufficient and said: 
This rule makes sense. A rule that would permit the em-
ployer to fire a whistleblower with impunity before the em-
ployee contacted the authorities would encourage 
employers promptly to discharge employees who bring 
complaints to their attention, and would give employees 
with complaints an incentive to bypass management and 
go directly to the authorities. This would deprive manage-
See generally Gray, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 99, at 79. 
See supra Part II.D (discussing the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act 
and its applicability to internal whistleblowers). 
See supra Part n.B (discussing the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act and its applicability to internal whistleblowers). 
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the WhoUry plurality's 
acknowledgment of the fact that other states had extended the tort of abu-
sive discharge to internal whistleblowers). 
See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
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ment of the opportunity to correct oversights straightaway, 
solve the problem by disciplining errant employees, or 
clear up a misunderstanding on the part of a 
whistleblower. The likely result of a contrary rule would 
be needless public investigations of matters best addressed 
internally in the first instance. Employers benefit from a 
system in which the employee reports suspected violations 
to the employer first; the employee should not, in any 
event, be penalized for bestowing that benefit on the em-
ployer .... 
255 
Whether the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut's hypothesis on how the requirement of exter-
nal reporting may impact the internal employee reporting 
has any merit is inapposite. We refuse to create a public pol-
icy grounded only in mere supposition about the employer/ 
employee relationship; the public policy mandates in this 
State must be based on some discernible principle of law as 
articulated by the Legislature or the courts.203 
B. A Comprehensive State Statute 
The Maryland General Assembly should consider enacting a com-
prehensive whistleblower statute along the lines of the Health Care 
Act. First, a comprehensive statute with a one-year statute of limita-
tions would provide a private cause of action with a reasonable limita-
tion period.204 Second, it would protect internal and external 
whistleblowers205 (other than those who go to the press), in both the 
private and public (other than those employed in the executive 
branch)206 sectors. Third, it would require as a condition of protec-
tion that the employee first attempt to resolve the situation internally 
and have submitted a signed statement to the employer about the sus-
pected violation. Fourth, it would allow for an employer defense of 
dismissal for a reason other than the employee's disclosure of the in-
formation. Fifth, it would provide for an award of reasonable attor-
ney's fees and expenses to the employer if an employee brings an 
action in bad faith and without a basis in law or fact. 
203. 
204. 
205. 
206. 
Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 63 n.15, 803 A.2d 482, 496 
n.15 (2002) (Battaglia, j., plurality) (citations omitted). 
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the similar provisions 
of the Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act). 
The enactment of a comprehensive statute that protects internal 
whistleblowers as well as external whistle blowers would provide an incentive 
to corporations to implement "a mechanism for its employees to report 
organizational wrongdoing" without fear of reprisal and thus capture the 
corporate benefits of "improved worker safety, morale, and conduct, as well 
as decreased legal risk." Callahan et aI., supra note 22, at 196. 
Employees of the executive branch are covered by Executive Branch Em-
ployee Whistleblower Protection Act. See Part ILA. 
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The enactment of this type of comprehensive statute clearly would 
preempt Wholey. It would also raise the question of how its enactment 
relates to the earlier four specific statutes. The gap in the Health Care 
Act is that it applies only to disclosures by non-state licensed employ-
ees reporting suspected violations of a law that created specific sub-
stantial threats to public health or safety.207 It does not cover all 
employees and all violations of the law.208 The proposed comprehen-
sive statute would cover this type of gap. 
The gap under the Maryland FEPA is that there is no statutory or 
common law remedy for employees of "statutory small employers" 
who are the victims of retaliatory action other than discharge. The 
proposed statute would provide a remedy for these types of 
whistle blowers. 209 
Finally, the MOSHA does not provide a remedy for retaliatory ac-
tions against internal whistleblowers.210 A new, comprehensive statute 
would also fill that gap by providing a tort remedy. Under such a 
statute, if Time's featured "Person of the Year" had suffered retaliatory 
actions from their employers for their internal whistle blowing activi-
ties, they would have had a legal remedy in Maryland. 
207. 
208. 
209. 
210. 
See supra notes 60 and accompanying text. 
Id. 
One difficulty here is the existing disparity in remedies available under the 
tort theory of recovery in contrast with those available under the statute. 
See generally Gray, Abusive Discharge, supra note 99, at 13. 
See Part II.C. 
